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Abstract
Many stated preference studies have reported framing effects in re-
sponses to valuation questions. This occurs when respondents use irrel-
evant information contained in a question to help them value the good.
We investigate if respondent uncertainty can explain two commonly ob-
served framing effects in contingent valuation studies. Specifically using
a double bounded dichotomous choice elicitation format, we investigate
anchoring (or starting-point bias) and the shift effect, which may indi-
cate if the method is incentive compatible. Respondent uncertainty is
measured using a follow up question that asks respondents their cer-
tainty about their valuation. We find evidence that the anchoring effect
is stronger for respondents expressing uncertainty about their valuation
compared to respondents expressing certainty. The shift effect is sig-
nificant and negative only for respondents expressing certainty. Our
findings suggest that anchoring can be reduced if respondents are cer-
tain of their valuation, and that iterative elicitation formats are not
incentive compatible.
Keywords: Contingent valuation, heterogeneous framing, respondent
certainty
JEL codes: D12, D60,
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A Introduction
Stated preference methods are widely applied in many different areas of pub-
lic decision making, such as the environment, health, and transport. These
methods are used to elicit monetary values for non-market goods. Stated pref-
erence methods use questionnaires and ask respondents their willingness to
pay for goods, such as public goods, that are not traded in the market. Indi-
viduals may be uncertain about their willingness to pay because they have no
prior consumption experience and are likely to possess only limited information
about the good in question.
Individuals may try to cope with their uncertainty about the good by using
irrelevant information from the questionnaire, such as the question’s phrasing
or the structure of possible responses to aid them in providing a valuation
of the good (McFadden, 1994). This behaviour is called framing. Framing
is problematic in stated preference studies because much of the information
presented in the questionnaire is not designed to convey information about the
value of the good.
In this study, we connect two areas of research in contingent valuation: re-
spondent certainty and framing effects. We use a data set that combines a
post-decision certainty measure with a double bounded dichotomous choice
elicitation format. We find that respondents who are uncertain about their
willingness to pay are more likely to use irrelevant information when answer-
ing the contingent valuation questions.
A number of contingent valuation studies acknowledge that while individu-
als have preferences for non-market goods, they may not be able to express
their willingness to pay for the unfamiliar good with certainty (Ready et al.,
1995; Wang, 1997). Li and Mattson (1995) asked respondents to state how
uncertainty they were about their willingness to pay on a scale between 0-
100%. Respondents were asked this after they had answered the contingent
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valuation question. Li and Mattson (1995) interpret individuals’ responses as
a probabilistic judgement about their previous valuation response and they
find that uncertain respondents provide noisier answers. Post-decision cer-
tainty measures have taken several forms including verbal scales (definitely
sure, probably sure), and numerical scales (ranging from 1=very certain to
5=very uncertain, or 1=very certain to 10=very uncertain). In contingent
valuation studies, post-decision certainty measures are used to eliminate hy-
pothetical bias by calibrating willingness to pay responsess. Blumenschein
et al. (2008) state that willingness to pay can be measured accurately if a
post-decision certainty measure is added to the study. Champ et al. (1997)
was the first study to compared hypothetical willingness to pay (donate) for
a public good with actual donations. They found that hypothetical donations
were greater than actual donations, however this difference was eliminated if
only very certain respondents were considered in the analysis (respondents
were asked their certainty on a 1-10 scale following the hypothetical willing-
ness to pay question). Similar results have been found by Blumenschein et al.
(1998, 2001, 2008) and Johannesson et al. (1998, 1999).
The most commonly applied stated preference method is dichotomous choice
contingent valuation. However, this provides limited information regarding
respondents’ true willingness to pay. The initial dichotomous choice contingent
valuation question (DC1) can be supplemented with a second dichotomous
choice question (DC2) resulting in the double-bounded dichotomous choice
(DBDC) format. Responses to DC1 determine the bid offered in DC2. If a
respondent states ‘yes’ in DC1 a higher bid is offered in DC2, and vice versa.
There are two framing effects most frequently associated with the double
bounded dichotomous choice format. The first framing effect is anchoring. In
this case, responses to DC2 are dependant on the bid offered in DC1 (Cameron
and Quiggan, 1994). Herriges and Shogren (1996) propose a model of DBDC
data in which respondents combined their prior willingness to pay expressed
at DC1 with the bid amount specified in DC1 and form a revised (posterior)
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willingness to pay, which is the weighted average of both amounts. Herriges
and Shogren (1996) find if this effect is ignored then estimated willingness to
pay is biased. The second effect is a shift in respondents’ answers between
the two contingent valuation questions. This shift effect can be either positive
or negative. A positive shift represents ‘yeah-saying’ or acquiesence bias; a
tendency for respondents to say ‘yes’ to any bid amount regardless of their
true willingness to pay (Alberini et al., 1997). For example, respondents are
more likely to answer ‘yes’ to follow-up contingent valuation questions when
they have answered ‘yes’ to the initial question. A negative shift can be ex-
plained if the elicitation format is not incentive compatible because the second
contingent valuation question acts as a signal and influences the respondents’
answers (Whitehead, 2002; Carson and Groves, 2007). Carson and Groves
(2007) argue that the second bid amount in DBDC creates uncertainty about
either the cost of the good (to the respondent), or the quality of the good
that will be provided. Carson and Groves (2007) suggest that when DC2 is
higher than DC1 respondents interpret this as an attempt by the government
(or provider of the good) to raise additional revenue, and a when DC2 is lower
than DC1 this signals that a lower quality good, than was described, will be
provided. Whitehead (2002) combined both anchoring and shift effects into
one econometric model.
Anchoring and the shift effect are both framing effects that occur when respon-
dents use irrelevant information contained in the question frame to aid their
decision. Usually when analysing framing effects the researcher has assumed
that the effects are constant across the sample. However, just as one does not
expect all respondents to hold the same valuation for a good, one may not
expect all respondents to ‘frame’ the contingent valuation exercise in the same
manner. For instance, not all respondents will anchor their response to DC2 on
the bid presented in DC1, and of those respondents who do anchor the degree
of anchoring may differ. Recent studies have developed econometric models
that introduced heterogeneity into the framing process (Flachaire et al., 2007;
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Aprahamian et al., 2007, 2008). Using monte-carlo simulation, Aprahamian
et al. (2007) show that parameter estimates are biased if a homogeneous an-
choring model is applied when the true anchoring is heterogenous. Further,
Aprahamian et al. (2007), in a study that values a reduction of air pollution
using dichotomous choice with open-ended follow-up contingent valuation, find
that 25% of respondents do not anchor, 25% of respondents anchor perfectly,
and the rest are between these two extreme cases. Similarly, Flachaire et al.
(2007) investigate heterogenous anchoring in a DBDC study valuing the French
natural park of Camargue. They borrow tools from social psychology to assess
respondents’ representation of the good, and suggest that respondents who do
not have an “elaborated view on the subject” are more likely to anchor. How-
ever, Aprahamian et al. (2007) and Flachaire et al. (2007) do not include a
shift parameter in their analysis. Aprahamian et al. (2008) using monte-carlo
analysis show that spurious shift effects can occur if homogeneous anchoring
is assumed when the true anchoring process is heterogeneous. We develop this
research by considering that both framing effects (anchoring and shift) are
heterogenous, and we use respondents’ self-reported certainty as a measure of
their susceptibility to framing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric model
of heterogeneous framing, which incorporates respondent uncertainty as an
explanation for heterogeneity. Section 3 discusses the study design. Section 4
presents and discusses the results. We conclude with recommendations for the
use of the contingent valuation method in public decision making in section 5.
B Econometric model
Our model considers four types of heterogeneity resulting from respondent
uncertainty. Certain and uncertain respondents may differ with respect to
their WTP, the variance of their WTP, the degree of anchoring on the initial
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bid, and the shift effect induced by the second bid.
Respondent i’s uncertainty is modelled through variable Ui. This variable is
a categorical level of individual uncertainty; certain or uncertain.1 We model
respondent i’s unobserved willingness to pay W ∗i1 as follows:
(1) W ∗i1 = Xiβ + Uiθ + i, i ∼ NID(0, σ2i )
where Xi is a set of respondent characteristics that may be expected to influ-
ence willingness to pay. The error terms i are Normally and Independently
Distributed (NID). Respondent uncertainty can have two effects: First, Ui ac-
counts for a potential shift of respondent’s W ∗i1 due to uncertainty. Second,
the variances of certain and uncertain respondents’ unobserved willingness to
pay, W ∗i1, can differ such that
(2) σi = σc(1− Ui) + σuUi
where σ2c and σ
2
u are the variances of error terms for certain respondents and
uncertain respondents, respectively.
In a double-bounded mechanism, W ∗i1 is not observed, rather we observe re-
sponses to an initial bid Ai1 and a second bid Ai2. When the respondent
answers the first bid (Ai1), their response reveals the value of an indicator
variable, Ii(Ai1) = 0, or 1 (‘no’ or ‘yes’) where
Ii(Ai1) = 1 if W
∗
i1 ≥ Ai1 and Wi1 = 0 otherwise
1We restrict what follows to the simple binary case where the respondent is classified as
certain or uncertain. Extending the model to consider more than two uncertainty levels is
straightforward.
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If the respondent answers ‘yes’ to the initial willingness to pay question, a
higher follow-up bid Ai2 is presented (Ai2 > Ai1). Similarly, if the respondent
answers ‘no’ to the initial question a lower follow up bid is presented (Ai2 <
Ai1). Following Herriges and Shogren (1996), we consider that respondents’
willingness to pay is modelled by equation (1). However, if respondents anchor
on Ai1 then their response to the follow-up question is a linear combination of
W ∗i1 and the initial bid Ai1. Further a “shift” parameter is added, to account
for potential incentive incompatibility induced by the follow-up question or
‘yea-saying’ behaviour (Whitehead, 2002). Thus, the respondents’ unobserved
willingness to pay when presented with the follow-up question is defined as:
Wi2 = (1− γi)W ∗i1 + γiAi1 + δi
Where γi accounts for the anchoring effect (starting-point bias) and lies in the
interval [0, 1]. The “shift” parameter δi accounts for incentive incompatibility
or ‘yea’-saying. Incentive incompatibility or yea-saying exists if δi < 0 or δi > 0
respectively. If δi = 0 no effect exists.
Both Herriges and Shogren (1996) and Whitehead (2002) assume a constant
anchoring parameter across the sample (γi = γ). Further, Whitehead (2002)
assumes the shift effect to be constant (δi = δ). We allow individuals to differ
in their anchoring on the initial bid, as proposed by Aprahamian et al. (2008)
and Flachaire et al. (2007). We focus on the case where anchoring differs with
respect to respondent’s uncertainty. The anchoring parameter is defined as:
(3) γi = γc(1− Ui) + γuUi
where certain respondents and uncertain respondents anchor with a level γc
and γu respectively. Similarly the shift effect δi can also differ with respect to
respondent’s uncertainty:
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(4) δi = δc(1− Ui) + δuUi
The probabilities of respondents’ answers to the first and the second bid are
such that
P [Ii(Ai1) = 1, Ii(Ai2) = 1] = P (Ai2 < Wi2)
P [Ii(Ai1) = 1, Ii(Ai2) = 0] = P (Ai1 < Wi2 < Ai2)
P [Ii(Ai1) = 0, Ii(Ai2) = 1] = P (Ai2 < Wi2 < Ai1)
P [Ii(Ai1) = 0, Ii(Ai2) = 0] = P (Wi2 < Ai2)
Under the assumption of normally distributed error terms, these probabilities
are defined as follows:
P (Ai2 < Wi2) = 1− Φ
[
1
σi
(
Ai2 − γiAi1
1− γi − µi − δi
)]
P (Ai1 < Wi2 < Ai2) = Φ
[
1
σi
(
Ai2 − γiAi1
1− γi − µi − δi
)]
− Φ
[
Ai1 − µi
σi
]
P (Ai2 < Wi2 < Ai1) = Φ
[
Ai1 − µi
σi
]
− Φ
[
1
σi
(
Ai2 − γiAi1
1− γi − µi − δi
)]
P (Wi2 < Ai2) = Φ
[
1
σi
(
Ai2 − γiAi1
1− γi − µi − δi
)]
where Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, µi = Xiβ+
Uiθ and σi, γi and δi are given by equations (2), (3) and (4) respectively.
We then estimate the model by maximum likelihood using the log-likelihood
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function
` =
n∑
i=1
{
Wi1Wi2 log[P (Ai2 < Wi2)]
+Wi1(1−Wi2) log[P (Ai1 < Wi2 < Ai2)]
+ (1−Wi1)Wi2 log[P (Ai2 < Wi2 < Ai1)]
+ (1−Wi1)(1−Wi2) log[P (Wi2 < Ai2)]
}
C Survey design and data
The good being valued in our study is the provision of a national air ambulance
service in England and Wales. Air ambulances are part of the emergency ser-
vices in England and Wales. However, in England and Wales air ambulances
are not fully funded by the National Health Service. The level of government
funding (from the National Health Service) for the air ambulance service varies
across the regions in England and Wales, and in many cases the regional service
is supported by donations from the public to a charitable organisation. The
data used in this paper elicited willingness to pay from a representative ran-
dom sample of 1400 members of the public. Respondents were interviewed us-
ing computer assisted telephone interview (CATI). Individuals were randomly
assigned to one of two payment vehicles (taxation and charitable donation).
Both payment vehicles were, and are currently, used to fund the air ambulance
service in England and Wales. Respondents’ willingness to pay was elicited
using a two-stage process. Initially, individuals were asked if they were willing
to pay anything each year to ensure the future provision of the air ambulance
service. Subsequently, individuals who stated ‘yes’ entered double bounded
dichotomous choice exercise and were randomly assigned an initial bid. Indi-
viduals who stated ‘no’ to the intial question were asked the reasons for their
response.
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On starting the double bounded dichotomous choice exercise, individuals were
told that they would be presented with two valuation questions and that the
second valuation question was dependent on their response to the initial val-
uation question. Individuals were randomly presented with one of five initial
bids (A1): £25 £50, £100, £200, and £300. If a ‘yes’ (‘no’) response was
given to A1, respondents were presented with a higher (lower) ‘follow up bid’
(A2). Thus the bid amounts presented in A2 depend on the randomly assigned
A1. The study design gave the following set of bid sequences: £25 (A¯2=£10
and A2=£50); £50 (£25,£100); £100 (£50,£200); £200 (£100,£300); £300
(£200,£400).
Air ambulances were introduced fairly recently as part of the emergency ser-
vices in England and Wales, and they are less frequently used than traditional
road ambulances. We expect that familiarity with the air ambulance service
will vary across respondents, and familiarity will depend on the use of air
ambulances near where respondents live and the fundraising efforts of their
regional air ambulance charity. Following A1 individuals were asked to assess
their degree of certainty about their response. Certainty was measured on
a 5-point scale (1=very uncertain to 5=very certain). Following the contin-
gent valuation exercise individuals were asked a series of questions about their
socioeconomic characteristics.
D Results
The final data set comprises of 690 respondents. Given the objective is to
consider framing effects in the DBDC exercise, respondents who stated ‘no’
to the screening question are not considered further; this reduces the sample
size from 1400 to 807. Missing values in major explanatory variables such as
income (215 missing) and education (82 missing) further reduce the sample
size to 690. Table 1 presents a summary of respondents’ characteristics for the
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initial sample and the sample considered in the analysis.
The proportion of respondents stating ‘yes’ across the bid amounts is presented
in Table 2. A priori expectations, that as the bid level increases the probability
of a ‘yes’ response falls, are fulfilled for all data. For the full sample the
proportion of ‘yes’ responses to A1 ranged from 80% for £25 to 18% for £300.
A similar pattern was observed for the proportion of ‘yes’ responses to A2
following a ‘no’ response (79% - 20%), and following a ‘yes’ response (36% -
18%). Table 3 presents the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses for certain and uncertain
respondents 2. Across bounds certain respondents were more likely to state
‘yes’ to lower bids and less likely to state ‘yes’ to higher bids. For example,
in the case of ‘certain’ respondents, the probability of ‘yes’ to the initial bid
fell from 80% for £25 to 18% for £300. With ‘uncertain’ respondents, the
probability of ‘yes’ to the initial bid fell from 59% to 42%.
The econometric results are reported in Table 4. For comparison the first
column presents the results for a homogeneous model, as proposed by White-
head (2002). This model accounts for anchoring and shift effects but not for
heterogeneity due to respondents’ uncertainty. The second column of Table 4
presents the results for the heterogeneous model presented in section B. The
parameter estimates indicate that the questionnaire yielded economically in-
tuitive results. First, the effect of income is significant, at the 5% level, for the
highest category (more than £45k), implying that respondents who earn more
than £45k have an increased probability of stating ‘yes’ (p =0.007). This is
reassuring and provides evidence of theoretical construct validity in the stated
preference experiment (Hausman, 1993; Bishop and Woodward, 1995). Second,
respondents’ mode of transport also has a significant effect: respondent drives
a motorbike (referent: respondent does not drive any vehicle) has a positive
effect, thus high risk road users are willing to pay more for the air ambulance
service (p = 0.02). This is logical as high risk road users are more likely to
2A respondent is considered to be certain if he states 5 on the certainty scale, otherwise
he is considered to be uncertain.
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benefit from an air ambulance service and this indicates that valuation esti-
mates are responsive to change in scope (Carson and Mitchell, 1993). Third,
the payment vehicle presented to respondents (taxation compared to, the refer-
ent, charitable donation) is significant: the probability that respondents state
‘yes’ increases with a taxation vehicle (p = 0.001). This is consistent with the
hypothesis that private provision produces an undersupply of public goods,
because public good non-excludability permits free riding (Bergstrom et al.,
1986).
Respondents’ self-reported uncertainty was included as an explanatory vari-
able in the willingness to pay equation. Respondent’s uncertainty, θ is not
significant in the WTP equation indicating that there is no significant differ-
ence between certain and uncertain respondents’ prior willingness to pay W ∗i1.
The variance of W ∗i1, σ
2, is however, significantly greater for uncertain respon-
dents when compared with certain respondents (p = 0.08). With respect to
framing effects, the results indicate that both certain and uncertain respon-
dents are influenced by the first bid. Uncertain respondents have a significantly
larger anchoring parameter, γˆu = 0.745, in comparison to certain respondents,
γˆc = 0.472 (p = 0.027). (The homogeneous model finds a significant anchoring
parameter at an intermediate level: γˆ = 0.528). This implies that uncertain
respondents anchor more strongly on the information provided by the initial
bid. The ‘shift’ effect attributed to the follow up question is significantly differ-
ent across certain and uncertain respondents (p = 0.005). Certain respondents
are more likely to state ‘no’ to a follow up question (incentive incompati-
bility), while the shift effect is insignificant for uncertain respondents. The
homogeneous model finds a significant negative shift effect. Finally, the mean
WTP for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous equal £139.88 and £108.79
respectively (with standard deviation 85.75 and 58.52).
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Conclusion
We investigated if frequently reported framing effects (anchoring and shift ef-
fect) were present in the data, and if these were linked to respondent certainty.
We reject the hypothesis that certain and uncertain respondents frame the
contingent valuation task in the same way. Firstly, uncertain respondents an-
chor more than certain respondents. This provides empirical evidence that
uncertain respondents focus more strongly on the information provided in the
contingent valuation scenario. This is inline with the conjecture of both Her-
riges and Shogren (1996) and Mitchell and Carson (1989) who argue that an
uncertain respondent may view the starting bid as providing information about
the “correct” WTP value. Our result is also consistent with recent empirical
studies, which show that anchoring can depend on individual characteristics
(Flachaire et al., 2007; Aprahamian et al., 2007).
Secondly, the shift effect is significantly negative for certain respondents, while
it is insignificant for uncertain respondents. This result is consistent with
propositions of Carson and Groves (2007), who state that for any contin-
gent valuation elicitation mechanism to be incentive compatible the respon-
dent must believe that their response will influence the provision of the good.
Carson and Groves (2007) assert that the second bid amount in the DBDC
creates respondent uncertainty either about cost or the quality of the good.
They predict that this uncertainty will have a downward effect on mean WTP
(this equates to a negative shift parameter in our econometric model). The
significant negative shift effect observed for certain respondents, indicates that
if respondents are certain of their answer to the initial question, the follow-up
question introduces doubt into their mind, and this has the predicted down-
ward effect on WTP. However, the insignificant shift effect observed for uncer-
tain respondents indicates that if any additional uncertainty is introduced for
these respondents it has no effect on their stated valuation.
Our results indicate that certain respondents are more consistent with the pre-
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dictions of rational behaviour than uncertain respondents. This is a positive
result for the proponents of stated preference methods and implies that by al-
leviating respondents’ preference uncertainty one can reduce the risk of biased
and anomalous answers and produce more reliable welfare estimates for pub-
lic decision making. Our results indicate that self-reported response certainty
does not affect respondents’ willingness to pay for the good. This finding de-
parts from Cameron (2005)’s findings on willingness to pay for climate change
mitigation. Cameron (2005) finds that willingness to pay for climate change
mitigation programs depends not only on the anticipated scope of climate
change, but also on the individual degree of uncertainty about the scope. In
Cameron (2005), respondent’s degree of uncertainty is the variance of respon-
dents’ subjective probability density functions of average annual temperatures
in their region. Thus, respondents’ uncertainty has a precise quantitative
meaning. This allows Cameron (2005) to estimate a structural model that
links respondents’ uncertainty to risk aversion.3 Estimation of this structural
form is not possible with measures of self-reported uncertainty, such as those
reported in this study, because self-reported uncertainty potentially combines
several aspects of respondents’ uncertainty.
Although self-reported uncertainty provides interesting information for data
analysis, it is a poor proxy for the many underlying sources of uncertainty
that respondents may face when completing a contingent valuation exercise:
the quality of the service; the continued future provision of the service; the
respondent’s future need for the service. Contingent valuation research would
benefit from the development and introduction of standardized (respondent)
uncertainty questions. A relevant theoretical and empirical framework may
3This is done by considering that WTP for climate change mitigation programs is an
option price that can be estimated by using a particular function form of utility (constant
absolute risk aversion, CARA). This is made possible because a CARA utility function only
depends on two moments of risk distribution: mean (e.g average annual temperature) and
variance (e.g. variance of annual temperatures).
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be provided by the literature on eliciting probabilistic expectations (Manski,
2004). These questions will help researchers both to understand, and to model
structurally how respondents answer contingent valuation questions. Stan-
dardised questions will also provide insights about the type of information
that respondents require to ensure less departures from rational behaviour in
contingent valuation exercises.
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Missing Subsample Initial sample
Variable Description Values n = 690 n = 1400
mean sd mean sd
TAX Payment vehicle is Tax 0 0.530 0.249 0.49 0.250
MALE Male 0 0.527 0.249 0.485 0.250
Age 0
AGE1 Between 18 and 29 0.191 0.155 0.184 0.150
AGE2 Between 30 and 44 0.354 0.229 0.304 0.211
AGE3 Between 45 and 64 0.313 0.215 0.308 0.213
AGE4 Between 65 and 74 0.103 0.092 0.141 0.121
AGE5 More than 75 0.039 0.038 0.063 0.059
Income 215
INCOME1 Less than £15k 0.179 0.233 0.302 0.211
INCOME2 £25-35k 0.239 0.182 0.233 0.179
INCOME3 £25-35k 0.190 0.153 0.173 0.143
INCOME4 £35-45k 0.139 0.120 0.121 0.106
INCOME5 More than £45k 0.199 0.159 0.171 0.142
Education 82
EDUC1 No formal 0.092 0.102 0.146 0.124
EDUC2 Up to O level 0.294 0.208 0.299 0.210
EDUC3 A level and Further educ 0.223 0.173 0.214 0.169
EDUC4 Higher educ 0.380 0.235 0.341 0.225
Household composition 5
NCHILD # of children in the hhold 0.678 1.039 0.601 0.994
NADULT # of adults in the hhold 2.071 0.878 1.998 0.890
Place of residence 0
URBAN1 Middle of a town or city 0.255 0.190 0.269 0.196
URBAN2 In a suburb 0.265 0.195 0.296 0.209
COUNTRY1 Edge of the countryside 0.326 0.220 0.297 0.119
COUNTRY2 Middle of the countryside 0.154 0.130 0.138 0.209
Vehicle 5
CAR Respondent drives a car 0.801 0.159 0.740 0.193
MBIKE Respondent drives a motorbike 0.051 0.048 0.035 0.034
TRUCK Respondent drives a van or truck 0.036 0.035 0.028 0.027
Respondent’s uncertainty
UCC1 Respondents declares that he his 0.184 0.150 na na
uncertain about his WTP response
Table 1: Descriptives statistics for the whole sample (n = 1400) and the
subsample (n = 690)
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Initial Answer to the Second Answer to the
Bid First bid Bid second bid
Yes 40 (py |y = 0.36)
Yes 112 (py = 0.77) £50
No 72 (pn|y = 0.64)
£25
Yes 26 (py |n = 0.79)
No 33 (pn = 0.23) £10
No 7 (pn|n = 0.21)
Yes 28 (py |y = 0.33)
Yes 85 (py = 0.70) £25
No 57 (pn|y = 0.67)
£50
Yes 25 (py |n = 0.68)
No 37 (pn = 0.30) £100
No 12 (pn|n = 0.32)
Yes 19 (py |y = 0.23)
Yes 81 (py = 0.56) £50
No 62 (pn|y = 0.77)
£100
Yes 37 (py |n = 0.59)
No 63 (pn = 0.44) £200
No 26 (pn|n = 0.41)
Yes 11 (py |y = 0.22)
Yes 49 (py = 0.37) £100
No 38 (pn|y = 0.78)
£200
Yes 36 (py |n = 0.42)
No 85 (pn = 0.63) £300
No 49 (pn|n = 0.58)
Yes 6 (py |y = 0.18)
Yes 33 (py = 0.23) £200
No 27 (pn|y = 0.82)
£300
Yes 23 (py |n = 0.20)
No 112 (pn = 0.77) £400
No 89 (pn|n = 0.80)
Table 2: WTP responses
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First bid Answers to the first bid
(£) Certain Uncertain
Respondents Respondents
25 yes 99 (80%) yes 13 (59%)
no 24 (20%) no 9 (41%)
50 yes 74 (75%) yes 11 (49%)
no 25 (25%) no 12 (51%)
100 yes 68 (59%) yes 13 (46%)
no 48 (41%) no 15 (54%)
200 yes 38 (35%) yes 11 (39%)
no 68 (65%) no 17 (61%)
300 yes 22 (18%) yes 11 (42%)
no 97 (82%) no 15 (58%)
Table 3: WTP responses to the first bid for certain and uncertain respondents
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Variable
Homogeneous model Heterogeneous model
Parameter (p-value) Parameter (p-value)
estimate estimate
Constant 21.28 (.559) 11.41 (.757)
Payment vehicle is Tax 81.49 (<.001) 80.24 (<.001)
Male 21.74 (.117) 21.35 (.121)
Age
Between 30 and 44 11.52 (.580) 15.68 (.450)
Between 45 and 64 4.40 (.830) 8.29 (.688)
Between 65 and 74 15.59 (.596) 24.57 (.405)
More than 75 -76.61 (.059) -52.85 (.182)
Income
£15-25k 30.56 (.145) 34.50 (.099)
£25-35k 26.23 (.264) 30.72 (.189)
£35-45k 24.59 (.337) 24.04 (.345)
More than £45k 64.15 (.010) 67.08 (.007)
Education
Up to o level 18.15 (.473) 21.52 (.396)
Further educ 16.81 (.528) 25.22 (.346)
Higher educ 30.86 (.229) 32.20 (.213)
# of childs in the hhold -1.99 (.783) -3.94 (.588)
# of adults in the hhold 0.94 (.910) 2.40 (.776)
Place of residence
In a suburb -0.23 (.990) 0.85 (.963)
Edge of the countryside 5.65 (.759) 3.84 (.835)
Middle of the countryside 19.82 (.374) 18.41 (.412)
Respondent drives a car -35.59 (.052) -33.27 (.070)
Respondent drives a motorbike 79.13 (.015) 76.32 (.020)
Respondent drives a van or truck 17.99 (.637) 19.57 (.626)
Mean effect of respondent’s uncertainty
Uncertain respondents: θˆ - - -24.16 (.342)
Variance of error terms
Homogeneous variance (σi = σˆ) 157.46 (<.001) - -
Certain Respondents: σˆc 146.74 (<.001)
Uncertain respondents: σˆu 231.92 (<.001)
Anchoring
Homogeneous anchoring (γi = γˆ) 0.528 (<0.001) - -
Certain respondents: γˆc - - 0.472 (.007)
Uncertain respondents: γˆu - - 0.745 (<0.001)
Shift effect
Homogeneous shift (δi = δˆ) -4.72 (0.001) - -
Certain respondents: δˆc - - -6.23 (<0.001)
Uncertain respondents: δˆu - - 1.09 (0.755)
loglikelihood ˆ` 943.44 931.64
Mean WTP 139.88 108.79
Standard deviation of Mean WTP 85.75 58.52
Table 4: Econometric results (n = 690)23
